Abstract: Using stated choice survey data we report on subjects' perceptions of the risks of hurricanes and intended relocation decisions when faced with such risks. All of the subjects were displaced by either Hurricane Katrina or Rita, in New Orleans and other Gulf-coast areas in 2005. Results here suggest that subjective perceptions of risk are quite high as compared to scientific estimates of risk, and relocation decisions revealed from a discrete choice experiment are significantly determined by levels of hurricane strike risks.
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Introduction
In the fall of 2005 two major hurricanes hit the Gulf Coast region, resulting in devastating impacts, particularly for residents of New Orleans. As is well known, the majority of New Orleans residents were forced to evacuate, moving to several alternative locations across the U.S. At the time we write this (in early 2008), most of the people who evacuated have still not moved back to New Orleans.
In this article we report on initial findings from a stated choice survey of a small group of subjects who were displaced by the 2005 hurricanes, Katrina and Rita, and initially relocated to Houston, College Station, or Bryan, Texas. The sampled group, though small, is remarkable in that they all were deeply and personally affected by the hurricanes. All of the people in our sample evacuated from their homes and were still away months, after the hurricane. The homes of a majority of the sample were severely damaged and almost a third of the sample lost a family member in the hurricane. Our research evaluates the risk perceptions and explains stated intentions to move back to the area they left during the hurricanes, as well as location choices presented to each subject in a choice experiment.
We report here on three issues related to risk perceptions and preferences of the sampled evacuees. First, we consider the sample participants' perceptions of hurricane risk. In a short survey that subjects take, we asked each respondent his or her perceptions of risk. The first time the subject is asked, no information is presented, and on subsequent questions information was given to him or her. As more information was provided, respondents were given the opportunity to update their prior assessment of risks that they brought with them to the interview. We regress the respondents' stated probabilities of future hurricane strikes for New Orleans on characteristics of the subjects and their experiences during the hurricane. This is done in order to evaluate how perceptions of risk are affected by personal traits and impacts, as is consistent with the risk literature. Of particular interest, consistent with a model of ambiguity aversion, we find that uncertainty about the true probability leads the group to increase their "best guess" as to the probability of a hurricane. We test whether these perceived hurricane risks affect an individual's desire to move back to the Gulf coast.
We also report the results of a model that explains stated intention to move back to the area they left, which is analyzed as a function of the subjects' subjective risks.
Second, we report results of a choice experiment in which we can evaluate the trade-offs between given levels of risks and income presented to the subject, controlling for amenities and other characteristics of the location. We find that risks, though calculated differently in each of these models than in the above models, play a significant role in choosing particular locations.
In the remainder of the paper we first offer some background information on risk perceptions, and then present the structure of the risk and choice models, followed by results. Conclusions based on the modeling are presented in the final section.
Background Literature on Risk Perceptions and Choice Modeling
It is widely recognized in the discipline of psychology (eg., Slovic 1987 ), now often spreading over into "behavioral" economics, that if one wishes to explain behavior or stated preferences, appealing to subjective risk assessments likely works better than reliance on so-called expert risk assessments to explain it. However, the problems that arise for economists when subjective risk estimates are used are potentially numerous and can not be fully enumerated here. Among these, the key issues relate to how to incorporate the subjective risks into a decision framework commonly used by economists (see Shaw, Jakus and Riddel 2005 or Shaw and Woodward 2007 for discussion of some of these), such that theoretical axioms of preference under risk are not violated. Most often the formal modeling framework in economics is the expected utility model (EUM); use of the subjective risks in such a framework may be deemed the subjective EUM (SEUM).
The EU framework has guided most analysis of decisions in situations of risks with known probabilities and the SEUM of Savage (1954) can handle some situations where probabilities are unknown. These models have been successful not only because of their compelling axiomatic foundations and ability to describe economic choices, but also for the purely practical reason that their mathematical structure facilitates both theoretical and empirical analysis.
A set of problems in applying the EUM may arise when subjective risk estimates of the public are hugely different from the expert (science community) assessment. For example, in the work on nuclear/radioactive waste risks, the experts deem mortality risks to be on the order of 2 in 10 million, while a sample of subjects thought these to be thousands of times higher (see Riddel and Shaw 2006) . To make matters still worse, some people simply cannot reduce the uncertainty about the risks they face in order to reveal a unique probability distribution. This situation, often referred to as ambiguity, frequently leads to behavior that is inconsistent with either the EUM or SEUM (e.g., Ellsberg 1961) . In other instances where people make decisions they do so as if they place nonlinear weights on the probabilities. A classic outcome is their overweighting of very low probabilities and underweighting much more likely events (e.g., Allais 1953; Prelec 1999; Gonzalez and Wu 1999) . When there are large differences between personal and expert probabilities or when ambiguity is pervasive the axioms consistent with the EU and SEU frameworks are frequently violated. Below we ask questions of the subjects that help us discern whether they remain ambiguous about hurricane risks, even when they are given information which might conflict with their prior assessment of such risks.
Risk Perceptions and Natural Hazards
The economic impacts of natural hazards have been well-documented in the economics literature, but until recently these reports have lagged behind counterparts in the engineering and natural science fields (Lenze and West, 1994) . This disparity can be partly attributed to a lack of information regarding the behavioral effects of the occurrence and/or perceived risk of natural disasters. Such knowledge is critical, given the large portion of the American population which lives in coastal regions that are susceptible to hurricanes. Rappaport and Sachs (2001) point out that approximately 15% of U.S. counties are located in coastal regions, accounting for an astounding 54% of the population. It is also documented that real-estate costs are typically higher and rising along the coast than in inland areas; thus, the potential economic loss (insured and uninsured) resulting from natural disasters is high (Bengtsson, 2001 ).
In the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and following recent scientific studies indicating a possible rise in the intensity of hurricanes (Knutson, 2004) , it is likely that people will be increasingly influenced by their subjective perceptions of the risk of 6 hurricanes. The presumption is that the higher perceived risks of hurricane strikes and damage are, the more likely a person will be to avoid or at least mitigate against them.
For example, in communities located in potential hurricane zones, Kruse et al. (2002) argues that although citizens cannot decrease the probability that a hurricane will hit, they still seek to mitigate potential damage through such self mitigation policies as purchasing insurance and fortifying their homes.
Behavioral effects are not singular to individuals, as public risk perception has affected public planning for natural hazards. Peacock et al. (2004) found that location is the most important factor affecting individual perceptions of hurricane risk relative to other factors. Individuals are likely to perceive hurricane risk higher than scientific estimates would indicate, and relying on scientific assessment of risk does not sufficiently explain human behavior (Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al. 1991) . Also, it is unclear how these individual perceptions might change following direct involvement in an event (e.g. hurricane). One of the questions posed in this paper is whether subjective risk perceptions in the wake of Hurricane Katrina will influence displaced evacuees' decisions to return to the Gulf Coast, or relocate to a different area which is less susceptible to hurricane damage.
The occurrence of natural disasters provides a unique opportunity for economists to examine behavioral impacts of such events. Carbone et al. (2006) measure the influence of risk as an information signal in the housing market for two Florida counties.
Using a repeat-sales hedonic model, they find that the real estate market was significantly affected by Hurricane Andrew (which hit in 1992) in both counties, as the rate of increase in housing prices decreased after the storm. This decrease was found to be significantly larger for the county that experienced the full effects of the hurricane, implying that information signals regarding hurricane risk are more pronounced in counties that have previously been affected by a storm.
Few studies have examined stated perceptions or intended actions and compared them to actual behaviors. Whitehead's recent paper (2005) on intentions to evacuate North Carolina's coast in the event of a hurricane is a notable exception. In that, and an earlier paper by Whitehead and colleagues (Whitehead et al. 2000) , the key finding is that stated or intended evacuation behavior, much like our stated location behavior, does well in predicting actual evacuation decisions. The authors of those papers have access to data on intentions, and then at a later date, data on actual decisions that were made. Several new papers have emerged on hurricane Katrina evacuees, notably Elliot and Pais (2006) , and Landry et al. (2007) . These papers have focused on the relative importance of different socio-economic factors in relation to an evacuee's decision to return to Gulf Coast region. We seek to add to this literature by evaluating the role of perceived or subjective hurricane risks in similar return/relocation decisions.
While it may be too soon to generate "natural" economic experiments stemming from Hurricane Katrina similar to the previous papers, this study evaluates the impact of risk perceptions on future decisions using a survey of displaced individuals.
The Models
In this section we describe two simple empirical models. In the first, we estimate a model of the subject's stated risk of a hurricane striking New Orleans as a function of individual characteristics. The second model is a discrete choice probit model that estimates the probability that a respondent intends to move back to the Gulf coast as a function of demographic characteristics and the subjects' stated hurricane risks (readers not familiar with the probit model can consult any standard econometrics textbook, e.g. Greene 2003) . Together these models will allow us to explore the risk attitude and preferences over risky prospect of hurricane victims.
Risk Model
In this section we use a latent risk model as formulated by several psychologists and economists in past work. In such a model the dependent variable is the individual's stated risk and the independent variables are demographic characteristics and other variables that might affect an individual's subjective probability. As a recent example, Riddel and Shaw (2006) evaluated a sample member's perceptions of the risks of a nuclear accident and find that gender, insurance coverage, age, distance from the area of the highest hazard, and other demographic factors can influence a person's risk assessment.
For our exploration we use the expected hurricane strike risk for New Orleans as the dependent variable. Since probabilities are bounded by zero and one, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are problematic (as the underlying probability density for the OLS is normal, with theoretical bounds of minus and plus infinity) so instead we use a standard truncated (tobit) regression approach with bounds imposed at zero and one. This is not the only viable approach; a reviewer points out that could use multiple risk responses from each respondent in a panel-Tobit framework, but we choose to leave this for another paper. For a two tailed censored regression, let X represent a vector of respondent-specific characteristics, and y* be a latent risk variable corresponding to the following: A latent variable here means that while there may be some true underlying complete and continuous representation of all risks, these cannot be observed by us as researchers, and we therefore only observe some of the values. The resulting log-likelihood function for a two-tailed tobit model, with bounds at 0 and 1, is:
whereφ equals the standard normal density, Φ is the standard normal distribution function, and σ is the standard deviation of y* (estimates of sigma are included in the results table) . Results of this model are reported in Table 5 and discussed in the results section below.
The Stated Choice Model
Stated choice models and the experiments accompanying them are now standard in much marketing, transportation, environmental economics, health economics, and other economics-related literature involving discrete choices (e.g. Bennett and Blamey 2001; Louviere, Hensher and Swait 2000) . Using these models it is possible to identify the effect that a variable of interest (e.g., hurricane risk in this study) will have on a specific choice (where to live in this study). If a monetary trade-off is included, it is possible to place a dollar value on the variable of interest.
There are many variants of these models, with experiments ranging from paired choices to rankings of several alternatives or assigning ratings using some numerical scale. As the number of choices people face is limited (a discrete variable), the usual econometric approach involves use of logit or probit methods or their variants, depending on the type of choice experiment that was performed. Some underlying theory appears in the appendix to this paper.
There are many trade-offs that must be considered when designing the experiment. Perhaps the key difficulty in choice experiment design is that the number of combinations of choices expands very quickly when attributes of the alternative are added. Ideally, all relevant attributes would be included or mis-specification issues arise, but by including too many, the choice experiment becomes intractable. A related issue is that the attributes must be bundled in such a way as to avoid correlation problems. (see discussion in Louviere, Hensher and Swait 2000)
Another trade-off involves how many alternatives the subject must evaluate at once. On one end, the researcher desires presenting each subject with all possible alternatives simultaneously, however, it is thought that when there are many alternatives that this is too difficult a conceptual task for many subjects to perform (Bennett and Adamowicz 2001) . If subjects are highly educated (e.g., college students) they might be given difficult mental tasks. If not, it may be better to find an easier type of experiment.
A simpler approach is to present each subject with a single pair of alternatives at a time (A and B), let them make a choice between A, B, or neither, then proceed to another pair of alternatives (C and D), etc. We follow this pair-wise choice approach below.
The choice options used in the experiment in this study asked individuals to indicate whether they would prefer to location A, location B, or whether "Neither of these choices sounds appealing." The hypothetical locations consisted of three main characteristics that vary in the provided choice pairs: housing cost, monthly income, and risk of damage from a hurricane. A fourth attribute, which captures the host of other characteristics that define a city, was described to subjects by including text that said: This "attribute" becomes a choice label that acts in some ways like an attribute for each alternative. It simplifies the experimental design because it is used in lieu of many possible attributes that reflect cities of certain types. We expected that one or more of these three cities would be familiar to all of the subjects in a sample group, particularly
New Orleans, which they evacuated, and their host city of either Houston or College Station. Through the choices selected over the two hypothetical options provided, it is possible to estimate the relative weights given to these attributes.
Attributes and Econometric Specification
Each subject was randomly given four different choices to make, each involving a different pair of alternatives. It is important to note that respondents are not forced to choose between two choice locations because they are also given the option to choose "neither" of the choices presented to them. Respondents face different choices, and those living in Houston may not be asked to make a choice that includes a city "like Houston"
as one option. Each pair of alternatives presented has attributes that can vary greatly with a full factorial design. Each alternative can be described by the attributes and the levels of these attributes. The risk attribute variable has four levels (none, low, medium and high risk); income can take 8 levels, and housing cost can take 7 levels. There are thus 672 combinations of attributes for each location that can be faced in the experiment (3×4×8×7), but these must be squared because there are two location alternatives, so the collective number of combinations is in the thousands, so presenting each participant with all possible alternative is obviously not tractable. Each person in the experiment faces 8 alternatives randomly drawn from the full factorial choice set.
Using these data it is possible to estimate the preferences as a function of the attributes using a conditional multinomial logit model. If one assumes that errors are type I extreme value, the probability of choosing the jth alternative, P(j), can be written as:
Given the structure of the experiment itself, where each person receives several opportunities to make a choice, a short (few observations over "time) panel approach is appropriate to consider (Greene, 2003) . That is, our situation is analogous to one in which a person chooses on separate occasions over time. Intuition suggests that there may be a correlation between the responses that a single person makes in the four choice opportunities.
The subscript t will refer to the number of the choice set (1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd , 4 th ) faced by the individual. Panel structures are increasingly popular in discrete choice analyses because they allow for the analysis of fixed and random effects of qualitative attributes.
Suppose the aforementioned conditional model were reformatted to include the subscript t, as well as constant term for the jth choice, j α :
The assumption of fixed effects (some think better called "related" effects)
implies that the term j α is potentially correlated with some or all of the independent variables in X. Thus, a procedure is required that allows for the estimation of this model while eliminating j α . Such an approach yields consistent estimates of the β parameters.
Alternatively, if one wants to evaluate whether individual-specific heterogeneity exists within the model but this is not correlated with the regressors, then the random effects approach is appropriate (Greene, 2003) . Rearranging the investigators error term jt ε , we have:
Where j u is the unobserved source of individual specific heterogeneity (Greene, 2003) . Under the random effects model, j u is not expected to be correlated with the alternative specific characteristics jt X . However, the random effects model restricts the heterogeneity in the model to be normally distributed: σ . The random effects model is estimated using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature approach, (Greene, 2003) .
Results of the fixed and random effects models applied to our data are reported in Table 6 and will be discussed further below.
Sample and Experimental Design
For the sample, subjects were recruited in the broader region near Houston, Texas using advertisements in newspapers and on radio stations. This area includes Bryan/College Station, about 90 miles northwest of Houston, and many displaced residents of New Orleans ended up in the area, as well as in Houston. The text of the advertisements used to recruit subjects asked for people displaced by hurricanes Katrina or Rita to contact investigators at Texas A&M University. All subjects accepted into the study were told they would be paid $50 at each of two points in time for their participation in the experiment (we had hoped to interview them a second time, almost one year after the first interview). The first interview took place in May and June of 2006, approximately seven months after the hurricanes took place. After extensive attempts to advertise and recruit subjects, 78 subjects were recruited yielding 77 usable responses.
Admittedly we would have preferred to have a larger sample size. However, recruitment was very difficult as participants were hard to reach and were a highly transient group, that was, at the time of recruitment, moving from place to place in the wake of the evacuation. Still, the statistical analysis done here indicates significance for variables used in many of the models.
The experimental protocol was designed and implemented using a computerbased survey text that individuals were given in person. Each subject was provided with a laptop computer to answer questions asked them in the survey and was assisted with the technology. A monitor was always present during the survey. Key questions are explained below.
Experimental Design
Prior to the interview, focus groups were convened at Texas A&M University in
College Station in late fall of 2005 to test various questions to be used for the experiment.
Data from focus group subjects are not included in our analysis below as they received preliminary versions of the survey, or only parts of it. However, these alone were informative. The biggest thing we learned from the focus groups was that subjects from New Orleans were actually quite mixed in their desire for returning, with reasons having very little to do with hurricane risks. In fact, some said that they had already been hoping to leave New Orleans for years, but just could not afford to. A prominent reason for wanting to leave New Orleans had to do with crime risks. Others, however, disliked the culture in Bryan-College Station and felt uncomfortable there.
The Sample Profile and the Survey Questions
The interviews reported on here began with subjects being asked demographic questions including age and income in 2004. Next they were asked about their life prior to hurricane Katrina or Rita, how long they had lived on the Gulf Coast, why they had to leave their home, and their losses. Subjects had lived from less than a year to somewhere between 41 to 50 years on the Gulf Coast, with most having lived there between 5 and 40 years. Most of the subjects (61 of those reporting) did not own their own home when the hurricane hit; twelve subjects said they did own their home. Whether owned or not, the average time spent in the home before we interviewed them was about 9 years, with a maximum of 53 years.
Of those responding, 68 subjects said they still had relatives in New Orleans or wherever they were when the hurricanes hit the Gulf Coast; only 9 said they did not. This indicates close personal ties to the area where they were, presuming the subjects liked their relatives.
After the basic demographic questions, the subjects were asked several things about New Orleans or the city they left during the hurricanes, including whether they planned to move back to New Orleans or the Gulf Coast. Table 2 reports key parts of this information. It is striking that the large majority of subjects loved (68%) or liked (23%) the home they left. Yet, 52 of those surveyed indicated that they did not plan to move back.
Following these basic questions, with no other information given, subjects were asked their own perception of the risk (chance) of a hurricane the same strength as Katrina striking New Orleans in the following year (2006). They were presented with a scroll bar which allowed them to choose a probability any where between 0 and 1 (See Figure 1 ). After they have indicated this initial (prior) probability by sliding the scroll bar on the computer, they were then shown some educational materials with scientific facts about average hurricanes (e.g. the Saffir-Simpson scale used by hurricane experts), their force, and their probability of hitting the key locations discussed in the survey. They were asked for their subjective estimates a second time.
Next, they were shown the hurricane risks on a risk ladder, a conventional riskcommunication device that features common risky events visually, from the top of the "ladder" to the bottom (Carson and Mitchell, 2003) . Following this, the subjects were asked their subjective risks for the third time, specifically, they were asked if they had changed their mind about the initial risks they gave early in the survey, and if so, asked to indicate the risks that they believe pertain after reading the information. This process allowed for possible updating or even Bayesian learning. It is interesting that some subjects remained unsure or uncertain about the risks even after the last time they were asked about them.
Risk and Choice Location Results
Following the risk questions, each subject was asked to choose between pairs of locations presented to them. In this section we discuss the results about subjective risks, followed by results of the choice model.
Round 1 risks: Prior subjective probabilities
The stated probabilities elicited in the first round are entirely subjective and may or may not be informed by scientific projections of Gulf Coast Hurricanes. The average risk estimate in the first round is about 52%, and 27 of the respondents thought risks were between 40% and 100%; nine subjects thought the chance of a hurricane hitting in 2006 was 100%, but eleven subjects thought the chance would be zero (see Figure 2) . In contrast, The Tropical Meteorology Project predicted that a major hurricane in 2006
would hit New Orleans with probability 5% (see Klotzbach and Gray 2006) . Figure 2 shows that there are two frequency spikes at either end of the frequency distribution on initially reported risks, and illustrates the large spread of responses.
Subjects were asked to provide a range of estimates if they found providing an initial point estimate too difficult. Twenty subjects provided various ranges, and all 20 also chose the option "I looked at these and it is best to say I do not know," but nevertheless provided a range. We use the midpoint of the range for these subjects in depicting Figure   2 , but realize that for a considerable number of subjects, they really do not feel comfortable offering a point estimate of the risk of a hurricane hitting the following year.
The initial probability elicited might be viewed as the subject's "prior" subjective risk estimate, as it is based on the individual's belief with limited or no information (e.g., see Viscusi and Magat, 1992) . As previously discussed, individuals often have difficulty evaluating risk, and often overestimate the probability of a hazardous event. One of the initial findings of our study is consistent with this and not surprising: individuals who have first-hand experience with the hurricane have risk perceptions which diverge dramatically from scientific estimates. Our entire sample consists of individuals displaced by Hurricanes Katrina or Rita, some of whom were forced into the difficult and often traumatic evacuation circumstances that were well publicized following the storms.
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that evacuees' immediate hurricane experiences may influence the magnitude of their own subjective risk perceptions.
We expected however, that as we provided information to the subjects, they would reduce their initial prior, to some risk estimate closer to that indicated by experts.
As will be seen below, this did not happen, although there is a small but statistically significant decrease in risk estimates after the risk ladder is shown.
Round 2 Risks
After reading about experts descriptions of hurricanes and their risks (including information obtained the National Weather Service at the U.S. Commerce Department, and the Tropical Meteorological Project at Colorado State Universtiy), the subjects were asked if their opinion of the risks has now changed, and again to provide their own assessments. During the presentation of material, which includes some pictures and detailed descriptions of hurricanes of various magnitudes, they are told that the probability of a hurricane of the strength of Katrina hitting Miami is between 9 to 11%, for Houston, 5 to 7%, New Orleans, only 4 to 6%, and for Bryan/College Station, the probability is less than 1%. These expert-assessed probabilities are quite large, but obviously much lower than the risks elicited from the respondents in round 1.
Nonetheless, only ten subjects said their opinion had changed, and 47 said they had not (the remainder left the response blank). Of the full sample, only nineteen subjects went ahead and provided new risk responses that differed from their original ones, in fact including some subjects who said their opinion had not changed; mean subjective risk responses from the first two rounds were not significantly different from one another. We hypothesize that because the opinion question was asked slightly earlier in the survey, by the time that they were offered a chance to provide a new range they had in fact decided to change their minds. Some who changed their assessment of risks lowered them, but several raised them, so there is no clear pattern that can be discerned for these nineteen individuals.
Round 3 Risks
Finally, after examining more information, including the risk ladder, subjects were asked to provide their subjective risks one last time. They were told that if they feel comfortable doing so, they can mark one point on the ladder where they think risks would be for the Gulf Coast strike of their home area, and if not, they can mark a range.
Interestingly, 36 subjects gave a point estimate, with an average of about 45%. When these subjects' point estimates are pooled with the mid-point of the range for subjects who preferred offering a range rather than a point estimate, the average declines to about 43%. This presents a significant decrease in mean subjective risk from the first and second round samples using a simple t-test (t = 3.39). While the overall decrease in subjective responses as more information is provided might no be overwhelming, there is evidence that the visual representation of risk provided by the risk ladder encouraged some respondents to lower their subjective estimates.
Subjective Risk Model
To try to understand what factors influence subjects' stated risks, stated probabilities in the final round were regressed on various personal characteristics using the truncated tobit model described above. Results are presented in Table 3 . Some of the results are consistent with common-sense expectations. For example, if the subject's home was lost, their stated risk increases. The more education that a person has, the lower they state the risk to be, which may reflect education's role in processing the information given the subjects. The quadratic terms on education and age are not significant, and neither is the log of income. Most of the sample members are in similar income categories, so there is perhaps too little variation in income to pick up significant effects there. The sign on the parameter for the dummy variable, losing a family member, is surprising though more weakly significant: losing a family member was negatively correlated with stated risk.
One particularly interesting result is that the stated risk is positively correlated with the individual's indication that he or she was unsure about the risks that they
reported. This result is consistent with much of the ambiguity literature that finds that ambiguity averse people will tend to act as if the probability of the undesirable event is at the high end of the range over which they are ambiguous (e.g. Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) .
Using the predicted subjective risk estimates, we attempt to establish a relationship between hurricane risk perceptions and future economic decisions. In light of Hurricane Katrina, many questions remain regarding the displaced population, including whether or not evacuee's state that they intend to return to New Orleans. An overwhelming majority (52 of 78) of this sample indicated that they would not move back to New Orleans. A probit model, with the 0-1 dependent variable indicating 1 if the respondent answered, "Yes, I will move back," is estimated to further determine whether subjective risk perceptions are influential in this response.
Intended Moving Model
Subjective risks are likely endogenous and it would be problematic to simply include the subject's stated risk as an explanatory variable in the intended move model. Therefore, predicted subjective risks estimated using the censored regression are used as an explanatory variable, akin to using an instrumental variable in conventional regression analysis. Consistent with the hypothesis that risks are a "bad" in determining where to live, the coefficient value for subjective risk reported in Table 4 is Katrina evacuation experience would be less inclined to return). Initially, it may seem inconsistent that this variable would have a positive influence on the intent to move back, but it is possible that those individuals who stayed as long as physically possible during the hurricane would be the most attached to their homes, or to the city itself. Thus, these individuals would probably be more likely to return to New Orleans, regardless of their experiences during and after the storm. Losing a family member is also included, and is found to be negatively correlated with the choice to return, as we might expect. Next, we discuss the choice experiment results.
Utility is assumed to be a linear function of net income (Y) less housing costs (C),
and an indicator level of risk (r) for each alternative (none, low, medium, and high):
Note that normally in a discrete-choice model the linear specification of the utility function would result in no income effects (the marginal utility of income is constant) because income typically does not vary across the alternatives an individual faces.
However, we offer an income level for each choice, so in our case income does vary for alternative i versus j versus k. Table 5 shows the basic choice outcomes. Note that most respondents cooperated and provided responses. Many respondents were asked to choose between the same city (for example, both A and B are "like New Orleans"), but where the city had different attribute levels, i.e. risks or income or costs vary. This is plausible, given that any location, but especially New Orleans, will have uncertain income and housing cost opportunities in coming years. Most respondents choose locations with less than "high" risk, but some are willing to choose high risk locations and we can shed light on why they do so using the logit model that controls for all the attributes. It is important to note that observations where the "Neither" option was chosen were dropped from this analysis.
Given the scope of this study and the framing of the stated choice questions, it is difficult to interpret the choice of neither. Perhaps the individual prefers some alternative relocation choice different from locations A or B, or possibly the subject prefers not to move at all. As it is impossible to capture amenity values for these alternatives, this study only evaluates choices made between hypothetical locations A and B and, of the (312) total number of answers, the (41) responses in which the participant answered "Neither"
were dropped.
The choice model results for the short panel logit specifications are presented in Table 6 , with the second column containing the fixed effects, and the third, the random effects model. In both estimation approaches the estimated parameters are significant and have expected signs. Higher net income at a location increases the probability of that location being chosen, as do all of the indicator variables for risk, which are compared to the default case of high risk (i.e. the omitted dummy variable is for High risk). This is consistent with the economic hypothesis that respondents may be willing to sacrifice potential income and cultural amenities for decreased levels of hurricane risk. Also, however, while subjects were sensitive to the hurricane risk level "high," they may be indifferent when given the choice between low and medium hurricane risk. The fixed effects estimator uses algebra to eliminate the constant term, but the random effects does not. City labels are not included in the final model because the estimated parameters lack significance in both model formulations, leading to ambiguous interpretation of the city effect. Most experimental designs which randomly draw choice pairs from the fullfactorial set also include interaction terms between attributes. Given our limited budget, we generated a relatively small experiment, not large enough to be entirely consistent with the full-factorial, and thus we do not include interaction terms. Omitting these terms in estimation does not affect the magnitude of the other (remaining) parameter estimates.
The negative sign on the constant term in the random effects model can be interpreted as capturing the effect of the base case of "high" hurricane risk, which is negatively correlated with the probability that one will choose a particular location. The estimated parameter u σ in the random effects model is indeed significant, indicating that the assumption of correlation for multiple responses by one individual is valid. The random effects model is slightly preferred to the fixed effects model because of the significance this parameter.
Categorizing Risk
Using the predicted subjective risk estimates, we make inferences regarding respondents' risk perceptions, and a relationship to the future location choices they indicate in the experiment. Table 7 divides Categorical labels are matched with choice data to create Table 7 , which shows the frequency with which individuals choose locations that contain risk levels of none, low, medium, and high. Observations where respondents chose "Neither" or did not respond were not included, leaving 254 choice pairs. It is of interest to note that regardless of their subjective risk estimates, individuals are less likely to choose an alternative when the associated risk attribute indicates "high" risk of hurricane. This is not surprising, and is consistent with our hypothesis that subjective risk estimates affect economic decisions. However, individuals who indicated high levels of subjective risks chose situations with no, low or medium risks in essentially the same proportion. Those whose subjective risks were in the medium range are more likely to choose a location with risk level "none" or "low," and those with low subjective probabilities choose "medium" risk locations more frequently than any other.
Summing across all subjective risk categories, there is virtually no difference between the total number of choices for risk levels none, low, and medium. This suggests that individuals are more sensitive to extreme risk levels ("high") than other risk levels.
That is, regardless of their subjective risk perceptions, subjects tend to accept locations with moderate risks but are averse to "high" hurricane risks, even if it means sacrificing potential income or cultural amenities. We tested heterogeneity in risk preferences both by exploring interaction terms in the fixed effects model and by using a random parameters logit specification, though nether approach indicated heterogeneity in parameter estimates.
Summary/Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research
The analysis in this paper is based on sample of Hurricane Katrina or Rita evacuees. Both hurricanes occurred in the fall of 2005. At the time of this writing (February 2008) , most evacuees have still not returned to New Orleans. Though the sample size used in cross-sectional statistical models for this paper is somewhat small, the analysis represents a special opportunity to examine victims of Katrina in detail: a great deal of data on their risk preferences was collected. Results above show the difficulty that displaced hurricane victims have in processing information about so-called "expert" hurricane risks, when interviewed just after hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We expected this to a degree, though we had expected that after being exposed to informational material, many subjects might reduce their subjective risk estimate. Most of our subjects do not make such reductions. The subjective risk model indicates that those subjects that remain uncertain about risks after all educational material is presented to them report higher subjective risk estimates than those who do not remain uncertain.
This statistical result is consistent with other literature on ambiguous risks (e.g. Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989).
We also note that many in our sample stated that they did not wish to return to New Orleans, and in a simple model of intent to return, risk has a negative and significant
impact. In addition, we report results for a stated choice model involving possible locations that have hurricane risks as their attributes. The panel logit models of choice pairs indicates that a high level of risk significantly and negatively influences the choices people make, while net income (income less housing costs) positively influences these.
Future analyses will use results of the choice models to elicit willingness to pay (WTP)
for hurricane risk reduction.
Finally, note that we are aware that if a person makes a choice in the presence of risk, the ideal model incorporates this risk quite formally. Therefore, the utility maximization problem becomes one involving subjective expected utility, or at the very least, incorporates the distribution associated with the risks in addition to the investigator error. Cameron (2005) and Riddel and Shaw (2006) develop discrete choice models in the presence of risk, and after hopefully obtaining preference data on our subjects in a new round of interviews, we will proceed to develop a more formal model along those lines.
Appendix: Some Underlying Economic Theory of Location Choice
Following Lancaster's theory of utility (1966) , stated choice methods assume that utility is defined not only by the goods an individual has the ability to consume, but by a set of qualitative attributes that actually can define a good. Thus, a consumer's consumption of a particular good or combination of goods provides access to attributes which are the source of the consumer's utility. Utility, therefore, can be defined by attributes x in the following manner:
Rosen (1974) later extended Lancaster's attribute based utility framework, allowing characteristics to influence the market price at which they are sold, leading to the hedonic price model. Following Rosen (1974) , attributes can be incorporated into the consumer's utility maximization problem: The empirical choice model resulting from this theory is classified within the class of random utility models (RUM) because an individual's conditional utility (V) after choosing alternative i is compared to her utility conditional on choice j (V j ). As researchers we do not observe everything that the individual does, and we are thus left with the usual investigator error (ε i ), which generates the usual randomness in the model.
Since it is impossible to incorporate all arguments that influence an individual's utility into a given model, the utility function is composed of a deterministic component, i V , and an unobservable (stochastic) component, i ε (Grafton, et al. 2004 
Or alternatively, the probability that an individual will choose alternative i is expressed as:
When the errors are Type I extreme value distributed, the resulting econometric model is the conventional conditional binomial logit (or multinomial conditional logit if there are more than two alternatives). 
